![]() ![]() Therefore, the Navy used a 1916 congressional authorization to build nine fleet submarines to investigate the characteristics necessary for future subsurface vessels. This was a tall order, given that the predominant type of submarines built at the end of World War I (the S-class) did not have the surface speed or endurance to make a long trans-Pacific transit and stay ahead of the battle fleet. ![]() The interwar force was charged with supporting the rest of the Navy by scouting ahead of the battle fleet and skirmishing with the enemy, presumably in the Western Pacific Ocean. But as we enter an age of limited budgets and tough choices about what weapon systems are truly necessary, the Submarine Force is going to be pushed to strongly consider cheaper alternatives like the SSK.Ĭonsequently, it’s worth reviewing how the interwar Submarine Force, faced with similar choices regarding limited tonnage and funding, determined the right characteristics and produced the fleet submarine that won the decisive undersea campaign in World War II. Freeman’s opposition to the small submarines proved prophetic: The 800-ton (surfaced displacement) USS MACKEREL (SS-204) and MARLIN (SS-205) proved to be utterly unsatisfactory for operations and ended up as training vessels during World War II.įreeman’s words could have been written today by almost any career submariner in response to the frequent argument, made on an annual basis in the pages of PROCEEDINGS, about adopting conventional attack submarines (SSKs). this command believes that our energies should be concentrated on the development and perfection of a single type submarine sufficiently flexible to carry out any of the duties as outlined by our war plans. In other words, this experimentation has not represented an objective search for a large submarine or a small submarine as such, but a seeking for the submarine to fit our special requirements, much as we have sought after a battleship type and a destroyer type to meet the needs of the fleet. While it is true that we have some very large and some very small submarines, this is the result of prolonged experimentation to determine the size most adaptable to our needs. Leahy, the Chief of the Naval Operations: In response, Freeman wrote to Admiral William D. Despite a decade of development on the Navy’s fleet submarine, some senior naval officers still insisted on building smaller, cheaper, but far less capable versions. Navy’s Submarine Force faces tighter budgets, it could learn a thing or two from solutions that surfaced from an informal Submarine Officers Conference in the 1920s. Naval Institute of Annapolis, Maryland 21402.Īs the U.S. Republished with permission from the June 2011 issue of PROCEEDINGS a monthly publication of the U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS Naval Review issue. His book was also named as one of the 20 most “Notable Naval Books of 2009” by the U.S. ![]() Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warefare, published by Texas A&M University Press in 2009, and reviewed in April 2010 issue of THE SUBMARINE REVIEW. He is the author of “ Execute Against Japan”: The U.S. in naval and military history from Ohio State University in 2005. He served as a division officer on board USS HOUSTON (SSN 713), based out of Apra Harbor, Guam, from 2007 to 2010. Lieutenant Ho/wilt is the Navigator/Operations Officer on board USS NEW MEXICO (SSN779). ![]()
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